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Abstract: Hyman Minsky can readily be categorized as a post-Keynesian
economist, for he advances a purist’s interpretation of John Maynard Keynes’ The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Through employing a
rigorous Keynesian framework, Minsky developed an enduring contribution to the
literature bearing the title: “The Financial Instability Hypothesis” (1992), that
appears as Working Paper No. 74 at the Jerome Levi Institute. In this document
Minsky considered forces and variables that induce financial instability—that are
also specific to advanced capitalist economies. He challenges the classical
economists and the notion that a general equilibrium will prevail. Instead, Minsky
goes on to teach us that the actions of businesses, banks and government, working
hand-in-hand, serve to perpetuate cyclical, financial instability—defined by
inflationary and deflationary periods.
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This inquiry seeks to convince the reader that in his Working Paper No. 74
prepared for the Jerome Levy Institute, and that is entitled “The Financial
Instability Hypothesis”, Hyman Minsky considers forces and variables that
generate cycles in advanced capitalist economies. Minsky teaches us that capitalist
economies typically display cycles that are characterized by periods of inflation
that are followed by painful, deflationary periods. Minsky’s hypothesis of these
ongoing cycles challenges notions of a self-sustaining general equilibrium
advanced by Léon Walras, in particular. I shall begin this inquiry by emphasizing
Minsky’s scholarly appreciation of John Maynard Keynes’s contributions found in
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [1936]. Second, I shall
focus upon Minsky’s regarding how it is that financial crises unfold. Third, I shall
further elaborate upon Minsky’s understanding of financial cycles in capitalist
economies.
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Minsky’s Keynesian framework
Minsky defines himself as a post-Keynesian in the proposer sense, and this means
through offering specific references and quotes borrowed from the text of Keynes’
General Theory. Minsky (1992, 1) emphasizes that his financial instability
hypothesis can be seen as “… an interpretation of the substance of Keynes’s
‘General Theory’” (1992, 1), but so of adoration of Keynes is riddled throughout
all of Minsky’s scholarly writings. To better understand the financial instability
hypothesis, it is imperative to understand the Keynesian foundation upon which
Minsky built his hypothesis. In the preface to his Stabilizing an Unstable Economy
(1986), Minsky (1986, xiv) mentions that although his work can be described as
“post-Keynesian”, he uses Keynes’s work as the shoulders of a giant, upon which
he can stand and which helps him to see further and more clearly, and not as
simply dependent on the works of the “Great Man”.
In reading his book, John Maynard Keynes, Minsky (1975, 7) teaches us that
Keynes studied at Cambridge University, and was neither a traditionalist nor a
Marxist. Minsky (1975, 7) then describes Keynes as one who was on the “left,” but
was not extreme and he his positions tended to reflect his appreciation for the
middle ground. During the Great Depression, many classical economists were
scrambling to explain the economic downturn as a result of weak regulation in the
financial system, as well as errors which were avoidable with proper policy
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prescriptions. In the view of Minsky (1975, 6), the most prominent among these
economists was Henry Calvert Simons of the University of Chicago, whose view
was that the Great Depression did not register as a systemic flaw arising within the
capitalist system. Minsky (1975, 8) states that, to the contrary, Keynes correctly
pointed out that the Great Depression was indeed a symptom of the inherent flaws
in the capitalist system. Keynes went so far as to argue that nothing could be done
to avoid cyclical depressions in a capitalist economy, and only good policy could
help to control these depressionary periods. According to Minsky (1975, 6), the
economists were failing to address the root cause of the depression, namely, the
system itself.
It was during the seventh year of the Great Depression, in February 1936,
that Keynes had published his magnum opus, General Theory. Keynes’ book
endeavors to clarify the cyclical nature of an advanced capitalist economy, and also
to note realistic policy prescriptions and analytical tools that could be used to
address the issues arising with these cycles. The crux of the cyclical and unstable
character found in an advanced capitalist economy, according to Keynes, can be
traced to the instability of investment. Minsky (1975, 61) understood that Keynes
believed that the classical theory of equilibrium was not attainable in the way many
classical economists had theorized. Keynes thought of long-run equilibrium as a
moving target, which if ever achieved, would be for but for a short moment. From
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Minsky’s (1975, 68) writings we know that in Keynes’ view, each short-term
equilibrium should be understood as a transitory moment. Keynes’s view can be
best explained by noting that forces generate a tendency towards equilibrium, but
equilibrium is never actually achieved. According to Minsky (1975, 20), Keynes’s
work quickly caught on and became popular, and many economists welcomed
some of his innovations, such as the consumption function, while truncating others,
such as uncertainty in decision-making. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis
should be seen as an extension of Keynes’ efforts to deal with this subject of
uncertainty.
Minsky (1975, 66) specifies that many of the economists that interpreted The
General Theory tended to trivialize Keynes’s ideas regarding uncertainty, thereby
missing what proves essential for understanding this book. In the views of Keynes
and also Minsky, uncertainty proves fundamental to the modern capitalist
economy. More specifically, uncertainty appears when cash is transferred from
depositors to banks, which then lend to businesspeople undertaking investments.
The transfer of cash from one to another is founded upon the expectation that the
cash will be returned with repayments of the original principal plus interest. In
other words, Minsky (1975, 77) purports that the financial portfolios held by
institutions and firms in an advanced capitalist economy are axiomatically
speculative in nature. In the capitalist economy, as the businesses purchase capital
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assets with borrowed cash, the borrowing can be referred to as a “liability”, that is,
the business becomes indebted and must pay back the original amount at some
specified point in the future. Minsky (1975, 89) goes on to explain that managers
of the business believe they will be able to fulfill the liability commitment because
it is speculating that its investments in capital assets will indeed produce sufficient
cash flow to pay off the liability and also produce value in excess of the liability.
The imperative of accounting for uncertainty in economic analysis should be
seen as the Keynesian view that Minsky emphasizes. If the speculation of a
business materializes, then its stock will appreciate in value and the businesspeople
will have achieved their goal of producing excess value. At the aggregate level, the
stock markets will appreciate, and businesspeople will continue to play “the mixed
game” where skill and luck determine successful speculation. As the market value
of businesses continues to rise, bankers will gladly issue more debt because the
businesses should be able to fulfill their liability commitments.
It is based upon this Keynesian framework that Hyman Minsky developed
his Financial Instability Hypothesis. Without the shoulders of the intellectual giant
Keynes to stand upon, it is unclear whether Minsky’s financial instability
hypothesis would have been presented so brilliantly. Keynes’ influence on
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Minsky’s thinking is clear and his reliance on Keynes’ writings paved the way for
a penetrating understanding of the capitalist economy.

How Crises Unfold
Like Keynes, Minsky believed the modern capitalist, economic system to be
inherently unstable. The free-market forces can prove destabilizing by their very
nature, and so must be steered, constrained and stabilized, even if for a transient
moment. In the modern capitalist economy, government interventions intended to
induce stability tend to prove short-lived because the downside protection
encourages borrowers and lenders to take on additional risk-taking activities to
achieve profits. In Keynes, Minsky (1975, 162) explains that as these risk-taking
activities produce profits, the margin of safety borrowers and lenders require will
decrease, and the entire system will gradually become more risk prone. So, it can
be said that crises are formed in an advanced capitalist economy by both inherent
flaws in the system in combination with governmental interventions that intend to
keep the economy stable.
A crucial piece of the advanced capitalist economy is that it has a
sophisticated financial system. The financial system is composed of commercial
banks, investment banks, and many other financial intermediaries that mark the
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capitalist economy (Minsky, 1992, 3). As mentioned in The Financial Instability
Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 6) understands that banks are highly leveraged and
transfer the cash they receive from their depositors to businesses, with the
expectation they will receive a profitable cash flow in the future. Minsky (1986,
229) further clarifies in Chapter 10 of Stabilizing an Unstable Economy that the
fundamental premise of the business of banking in an advanced capitalist society is
the goal of profit maximization.
Reconsidering Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky (1986, 238)
explores the idea of bank management motivation. Institutional bank executives
are paid mainly in stock options, which can appreciate significantly if the banks
share prices increases. So, executives are motivated to increase the market value of
their shares because it will make them wealthy. Minsky (1986, 238) states that by
emphasizing growth, banks will inherently increase their financial leverage by
taking on more debt—which makes the financial system and economy more
unstable. These banks, which can be described as economic units, take on risk in
the hope of profit. In The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 6) states
that for all economic units, whether firms or individuals, there exist three distinct
income-debt relations that explain how financial crises arise. He notes these as
hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance.
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Hedge financing units are deemed the safest and most stable among all
income-debt relations. Hedge financing units are those whose projected cash flows
are expected to cover interest and principle payments on debt. For example, a
hedge-financing unit could be observed when a business borrows cash to purchase
capital equipment for use in manufacturing, with a strong expectation that the cash
flow from the project would indeed prove sufficient to service the debt obligations.
In The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Minsky (1992, 7) states that the more
significant the proportion of equity financing, that is stock financing, in the
company’s capital structure, the more likely the unit is a hedge financing unit. If all
financing units in a capitalist economic system were hedge-financing units, the
margin of safety for borrowers and lenders would be relatively high. Minsky
(1992, 7) goes on to explain that a high margin of safety with hedge financing units
could mean that there is a possibility that the economy would be a self-sustaining
and equilibrium seeking system. However, as Minsky and Keynes have pointed
out, empirically that such a system is typically not the case.
Instead of an equilibrium seeking and self-containing economic system (as
classical economists tout), Minsky (1992, 7) explains that we are more likely to
see a “deviation amplifying system”; whereby borrowers and lenders turn to
higher-risk activities in search of greater profits. Minsky (1992, 7) terms these as
“speculative financing units”, and can be defined by their cash flows proving
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sufficient for covering mandatory interest payments. As explained by Randall
Wray (2016, 79) in Why Minsky Matters, speculative finance units currently do not
produce sufficient cash flows to cover principle payments, but they are expected to
rise sufficiently in the future to do so. A riskier profile than hedge-financing units,
speculative financing units should be seen as the natural extension of hedge units
because the longer the period of stability, the more desperate the economic units
seek out profits.
The third and most risky profile of which Minsky warned is Ponzi finance.
Minsky (1992, 7) explains that Ponzi financing units are those with cash flows that
prove neither sufficient to cover interest payments nor principle. Unless Ponzi
units sell their assets or borrow additional capital to sustain themselves, they are
unstable and cannot succeed in the long run. Minsky (1992, 7) warns us that an
economic unit that adopts the Ponzi financing unit reduces the margin of safety its
creditors hold. Again, in Why Minsky Matters, Wray (2016, 79) goes further to
explains that a Ponzi unit borrows capital to pay its mandatory interest payments.
As described above, hedge financing registers as the only financing unit in
which the capitalist economy may be an equilibrium seeking and containing
system. Minsky (1992, 7) teaches us that when economic units inevitably leave
hedge financing for the two other units (speculative and Ponzi financing), they are
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likely to make the economy a deviation amplifying system. Minsky (1992, 4) adds
that each financing unit may last for a time, but eventually the skill and luck of
businesspeople will run out, and their pro forma statements will not materialize.
This is the point in time when a crisis occurs. Minsky (1992, 8) stresses that a
critical component to understanding the financial instability hypothesis is that the
economy is stable under certain financing regimes and unstable under others.
Minsky (1992, 8) mentions that another axiom of the financial instability
hypothesis is that the capitalist economy will transition to different income-debt
relations over periods of prosperity, turning from stable to unstable.
Through real-time, the economy will experience growth and prosperity and
this part of the cycle allows businesspeople to profit from their hedge financing
units. Minsky (1992, 7) makes it clear: as the good times and profits continue,
businesspeople will tend to become bolder and move to speculative units, and
eventually, they will succumb to Ponzi finance. Minsky (1992, 8) goes on to teach
us that predictably, the low margin of safety offered by Ponzi financing units and
the inability to service debt payments with cash flows will cause the businesses to
sell their positions, which will collapse asset values and result in a financial crisis.
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Minsky on Financial Cycles
Minsky (1992, 1) stresses that his financial instability hypothesis has both
empirical and theoretical aspects. As noted above, Keynes’ General Theory
explained that the Great Depression was not the wrongdoing of any specific actors;
rather, the deep and enduring downturn was but a reality which sophisticated
capitalist economies tend to suffer, though there are mechanisms that can be
implemented to lessen the damage. Historical episodes of expansion and
contraction, which continually occur in modern capitalist economies, are empirical
evidence supporting Minsky’s hypothesis. The theoretical aspects of the financial
instability hypothesis begin with the modern capitalist economy, which has capital
assets and a sophisticated financial system ripe with financial intermediaries.
Minsky (1992, 1) states that there are two main periods in a modern
capitalist economy: stable periods and unstable periods. When the times are stable,
real income tends to be rising, employment increasing, and there is a prevailing
sense of general optimism about the economy and future growth. During unstable
times, there are painful economic contractions wherein unemployment runs
rampant, and there is a negative outlook on the future of the economy. The cyclical
nature of the economy supports Minsky’s understanding that indeed there is no
“invisible hand” as Adam Smith and most modern economists proclaim. Minsky’s
view is that the dynamics of the capitalist economy prove destabilizing. As Wray

12

(2016, 16) clearly points out, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis argues that
even when times are stable, such stability will encourage risk taking and fiscal and
monetary policy tightening, leading to a fragile and unstable economy.
We can understand the financial cycles that Minsky knew to be an innate
characteristic of the modern capitalist economy by further examining Minsky’s
Levy Institute Working Paper. On the last page of this paper, Minsky (1992, 8)
teaches us that when the central bank uses its monetary policy tools to constrain
the money supply, the intervention only encourages more risk-taking behavior and
turns formerly speculative finance units into Ponzi units. Then we need to consider
that these Ponzi units are even more unstable than the speculative units, and can
exacerbate a future recession by collapsing asset values. Minsky understood that
stability turns to fragility, time and again, and this tendency proves integral to the
normal workings of the capitalist system.
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Conclusion
This inquiry has sought to establish that in his The Financial Instability
Hypothesis, Hyman Minsky considered the forces and variables that induce
financial instability. We can see that Minsky thought of financial instability as an
feature inherent to the advanced capitalist economy—a sort of unavoidable evil in
the system. While this short inquiry has not meant to offer an all-encompassing
analysis of the sources that might cause financial instability in the advanced
capitalist economy, it is sufficient to understand the forces and variables that
Minsky discussed in The Financial Instability Hypothesis. During times of
prosperity, economic units see great profits and success with comfortable margins
of safety through using hedging units, prompting them to take on additional risk.
Interventions by the federal government might also contribute to the risk-taking
behavior of economic units by limiting the downsides through protections. The
hedge units’ transition to riskier speculative units which then graduate to unstable
and very risky Ponzi units.
A question to ponder upon reading this inquiry is “What do we all make of
this?” Should the people accept that our current system will have good times and
bad times, with increasingly painful bad times and shorter good times, or should
we do something to change the system? After all, the capitalist system has had a
long run in the United States and in other countries, yet the neo-classical
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economists continue to affirm that the free-market system will correct itself. In
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Minsky (1986, 287) explains that it appears
current leaders and advisers in modern capitalist economies do not seem to be
aware that the day-to-day functioning of the economy leads to financial crises and
all sorts of economic woes. Perhaps there is a need for a new system, or a hefty
reform of the modern capitalist system that Minsky has clearly shown tends
towards fragility and instability.
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